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OPINION ON MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
We have before us motions by the appellants in this case for attorneys’ fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  The appellees agree that appellants are entitled to fees, but
dispute the amounts claimed.  The complicated factual and procedural background of this
case (with which the parties are thoroughly familiar) is discussed in our opinion in
4Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002), and
we do not restate it here.
I.
The legal standards governing our award of attorney’s fees are familiar.  Under 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b), our Court has discretion to award the “prevailing party” in a civil rights
action “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”  See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 429 (1983).  It is undisputed that appellants — who persuaded us to reverse the
District Court’s decision against them and direct that Court to enter a preliminary
injunction in their favor — were the prevailing parties in this action.  See, e.g., Tx. State
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (“[T]o be
considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to
point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and
the defendant.”); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179,
1185 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that a “prevailing party” is one that “achieved some of the
benefit sought by the party” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  We must therefore
consider whether the requested fees are reasonable.
In determining the reasonableness of requested fees, we first calculate the
“lodestar” amount, “which requires multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
by a reasonable hourly rate.”  Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).  The reasonable hourly rate “is calculated according to
  The parties agree that the “relevant community” in this case is the State of New1
Jersey.  This comports with our ordinary reliance on the “forum rate rule,” which allows
an attorney to claim the prevailing rate for his services in the district in which the
litigation was lodged.  See Pub. Interest Research Group, 51 F.3d at 1186-87.   
  A non-exhaustive list of these factors includes: “(1) the time and labor required;2
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.”  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-30 n.3; Pub.
Interest Research Group, 51 F.3d at 1185 n.8 (same).   
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the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”   Id.; Pub. Interest Research1
Group, 51 F.3d at 1185 (“In general, a reasonable fee is one which is adequate to attract
competent counsel, but which do[es] not produce windfalls to attorneys.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).  We then consider whether the time
charged is reasonable, excluding “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such
hours from his fee submission” to his client.  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Maldonado, 256
F.3d at 184 (same).  Once the lodestar amount has been calculated, a court has discretion
to adjust the fee up or down, based on a variety of factors.  2
When, as here, a litigant relies on several legal theories in support of its position,
we must decide whether the claims are “distinctly different claims for relief that are based
on different facts and legal theories” (in which case “work on an unsuccessful claim
cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved,” and
6is therefore not compensable), or “involve a common core of facts or [are] based on
related legal theories” (in which case the “lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete
claims,” and we must instead “focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by
the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation”).  Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434-35.  As the Supreme Court has explained,
cases involving . . . unrelated claims are unlikely to arise with
great frequency. . . . Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent
results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. 
Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended
on the litigation, . . . [and] the fee award should not be
reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every
contention raised in the lawsuit.  Litigants in good faith may
raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the
court’s rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a
sufficient reason for reducing a fee.  The result is what
matters. 
Id. at 435 (citation omitted).           
II.
A. Hourly Rates
We begin with the reasonableness of appellants’ counsel’s hourly rates.  Counsel
for appellants Tenafly Eruv Association and Stefanie Dardik Gotlieb — Robert G.
Sugarman, Harris J. Yale, Craig L. Lowenthal, and Richard D. Shapiro — claim $500.00
per hour, $350.00 per hour, $175.00 per hour, and $281.61 per hour, respectively. 
Counsel for appellants Chaim Book, Yosifa Book, and Stephen Brenner — Nathan Lewin
and Alyza D. Lewin — claim $550.00 per hour and $315.00 per hour, respectively. 
  Appellants cite a December 2002 article from the New Jersey Law Journal that3
lists the rates several top New Jersey law firms charge for the work of their partners and
associates.  See Charles Toutant, Firms Hike Rates, Weak Economy Notwithstanding,
N.J. L.J., Dec. 23, 2002, at 1025.   
  Appellees argue that, once the claimed hourly rate is disputed, a hearing is4
necessary to determine whether the rate is reasonable.  See, e.g., Smith v. Phila. Housing
Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Once the plaintiff has carried this burden [i.e.,
submitting evidence of the appropriate hourly rate], [the] defendant may contest that
prima facie case only with appropriate record evidence. . . .  If hourly rates are disputed,
the . . . court must conduct a hearing to determine the reasonable market rates.”).  But as
our discussion in Smith makes clear, it is not enough merely to contest the claimed hourly
rate; rather, appellees must submit evidence of a different reasonable hourly rate.  They
have not done so here.  Instead, they state conclusorily that the requested rates are
“excessive” and cite two District Court cases from 1998 (four years prior to our decision
in this case) awarding lower fees to different attorneys in different cases.  See Appellees’
Response to Motion for Fees, at 13 (citing Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 25
F. Supp. 2d 480, 494-97 (D.N.J. 1988), and Smith v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d
598, 602-03 (D.N.J. 1998)).  A hearing is not merited in these circumstances.    
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Appellees contend these rates are excessive.  
We conclude that the requested rates are reasonable.  There is no dispute that
appellants’ attorneys are experienced lawyers working at highly regarded law firms in
New York, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia.  They have submitted evidence that
the requested rates fall within the norm of New Jersey attorneys with similar positions at
top New Jersey law firms in late 2002 (when we decided this case on the merits),  and3
appellees have given us no contrary evidence.   To be sure, the requested rate for Mr.4
Sugarman ($500.00 per hour), an attorney in New York City, falls at the high end of the
range in late 2002 for New Jersey attorneys, but we are confident that an attorney of his
experience and educational background would command such a fee as a partner at a top
8New Jersey law firm.  And though Mr. Lewin’s requested rate ($550.00 per hour) would,
according to the evidence in the record, place him among the few top-earning partners in
New Jersey, it is plain from his qualifications and experience that he is worthy of such a
stature were he practicing in New Jersey.  We therefore approve the requested rates as
reasonable, given the evidence in the record that they are comparable to the rates charged
by similarly situated attorneys at top New Jersey law firms.
B. Time Charged
1. Issues that are Compensable
In deciding whether the time charged by appellants’ attorneys is reasonable, we
consider first whether, under Hensley, it is appropriate to award them compensation for
all work on this case or only the issues on which they succeeded.  Appellants raised
several issues on appeal, including constitutional claims under the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and a statutory discrimination claim under the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).  Although these arguments were in some sense
“distinct” (in that they were based on different legal provisions), this is not a reason to
deny fees for all claims.  Indeed, we note that each of appellants’ claims was based on a
common core of facts, and the arguments were intertwined.  
For example, although we held that the Fair Housing Act claim was unavailing
because appellants were not “victims of a discriminatory housing practice” within the
meaning of the Act, Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, 309 F.3d at 157 n.13 (internal quotation marks
9omitted), the claim was based on the same allegedly discriminatory treatment we held
violates the Free Exercise Clause.  And the Free Speech claim, which we likewise found
unavailing, was not only based on the same treatment, but led us to conclude that the use
of eruvs was religious conduct (and not protected religious speech), which in turn led to
our holding that the Borough of Tenafly’s decision to restrict that conduct violated the
Free Exercise Clause.  See id. at 161-62, 164, 168.
In this context, we conclude that the issues presented by appellants are linked
sufficiently that work performed on one would likely have had value for the others.  It
would therefore be “difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis,”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, and we decline appellees’ invitation to do so.  Appellants’
arguments “cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims,” but are instead merely
“alternative legal grounds for [the] desired outcome,” id., and we will award fees for
work performed on all claims.  
2. Individual Items
We now turn to particular items in the attorneys’ time sheets to determine if they
are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”  Id. at 434.  We note at the outset
that the fee schedule from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (“Weil, Gotshal”) includes only
the hours billed by Mr. Sugarman and Mr. Yale, and about two-thirds of the hours billed
by Mr. Lowenthal; it does not include time billed by other associates or paralegals, which
totals approximately 145 hours.  This, with the reduction in Mr. Lowenthal’s time,
  We also note that appellants’ attorneys do not seek compensation for time spent5
preparing and litigating the pending motion for fees, despite the fact we have expressly
approved such fees.  See Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 297
F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A party entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees is also
entitled to reimbursement for the time spent litigating its fee application.”).    
  Indeed, we note that all of Mr. Lowenthal’s challenged time entries fit within the6
number of hours for which he does not seek reimbursement.  Although his time sheets do
not identify the entries that are not included in the fee he seeks (rather, he has provided a
complete list of his time entries), we believe it appropriate to refuse appellees’ objections
to his use of time, since it appears to us all the entries to which appellees object are not
included in the requested fee.  
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represents a discount of about 360 hours.  The Supreme Court has recognized that
“‘billing judgment’ is an important component in fee setting,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434
(internal quotation marks omitted), and we believe this significant discount mitigates
many of appellees’ concerns about “overbilling” by Messrs. Sugarman, Yale, and
Lowenthal.            5
We have considered thoroughly appellees’ numerous challenges to the time sheets
submitted by appellants, and find most of the objections to be unfounded (and, in any
event, unpersuasive).  For example, appellees challenge the hours Mr. Lowenthal
expended drafting correspondence with the Court (about 9 hours), preparing necessary
forms and statements to allow the filing of briefs in our Court (about 30 hours), and
drafting the Fair Housing Act portion of the brief (about 22 hours), but we believe these
hours were necessary and reasonable in length, especially as Mr. Lowenthal’s hours have
already been reduced by one-third.   Appellees also contend that the presence of several6
attorneys at oral argument was duplicative and unnecessary, but we note this was a
  Appellees complain particularly that a large percentage of the hours claimed by7
Mr. Shapiro reflect telephone conferences with his clients and co-counsel.  Appellees
contend this is excessive, and further note that the fee schedules of the other attorneys do
not reflect several of the telephone conferences Mr. Shapiro claims.  First, we note that
Mr. Shapiro was the only attorney for the Tenafly Eruv Association who did not work at
Weil, Gotshal, so it is unsurprising he used the telephone more than co-counsel.  As for
appellees’ apparent contention that Mr. Shapiro’s entries are disingenuous, we note that
co-counsel did list almost all of the same telephone conferences, either explicitly
indicating a telephone conference with Mr. Shapiro or noting more generally attention to
the subject matter.  Indeed, of the 43 entries containing telephone conferences on Mr.
Shapiro’s time sheets, we have found only eight that do not correspond to equivalent
entries on the time sheets of co-counsel.  This could, of course, merely reflect co-
counsel’s failure to record properly a few conversations on their time sheets.  In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we will not penalize Mr. Shapiro by reducing his fee,
especially since the overall number of hours Mr. Shapiro spent consulting his clients and
co-counsel appears reasonable.   
  As then-Judge (now Justice) Alito observed in Neonatology Associates, P.A. v.8
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J., in chambers),
the idea that an amicus must be impartial is “outdated,” since “an amicus who makes a
strong but responsible presentation in support of a party can truly serve as the court’s
friend.”  Id. at 131.  We therefore reject appellees’ apparent belief that there is something
11
complicated case with multiple appellants raising important constitutional claims, and
those cases often “mandate[] the help of numerous attorneys for both parties,” including
at oral argument.  Planned Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 272.  They further challenge the time
(about 140 hours) spent collectively by the attorneys on meetings and conference calls,
but do not explain why this amount of consultation time is unreasonable given the
complexity of this case and the many parties involved.   Moreover, they complain that7
appellants’ attorneys spent time consulting with the amici in this case (which appellees
seem to suggest is improper), but do not explain why this was inappropriate and not
compensable.   8
unseemly about discussions between appellants and supportive amici, and conclude that
this time is compensable.
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Appellees also point out that Mr. Yale’s entries on his time sheets often report his
“att[entio]n to” a matter (rather than a detailed description of his exact task), and contend
those entries should be disallowed as violations of our rule that a “fee petition is required
to be specific enough to allow the . . . court to determine if the hours claimed are
unreasonable for the work performed.”  Washington v. Phila. County Ct. of Common
Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1037 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We have
explained, however, that the documentation requirements for time charged are not
exacting: “a fee petition should include some fairly definite information as to the hours
devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations, . . .
[but] it is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise
activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney.” 
Id. at 1037-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).  While it is advisable in certain
circumstances to provide greater specificity than Mr. Yale does, we believe most of his
entries (“Attn to brief,” “Attn to reply,” etc.) are sufficiently clear to allow us to know the
tasks to which he devoted his time, and we therefore conclude they are documented
properly.  We note two exceptions below in our itemized list of reductions of the
requested fees.
  Appellees also allege that Mr. Sugarman spent 19 hours reading the District9
Court’s opinion in this case, an amount they assert is excessive.  We have reviewed Mr.
Sugarman’s time records and do not find that he charged those hours.  The only entries
related to the District Court’s opinion are for three hours spent reviewing the opinion, and
for a total of seven-and-a-half hours spent performing several tasks, including reviewing
the opinion.  This is not excessive.       
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We are also unpersuaded by appellees’ objections to the time spent preparing the
briefs for this appeal and preparing for oral argument.  Appellees contend that Messrs.
Sugarman, Yale, Lowenthal, and Shapiro spent a combined 327 hours preparing their
opening brief and a combined 173 hours preparing the reply brief, and expended (in the
aggregate) 86 hours preparing for oral argument.  As stated, this was a complex
constitutional case with numerous appellants and amici, and we added to the mix by
requesting (two weeks before oral argument) supplemental briefing from the parties
regarding symbolic speech issues in the case.  Under these circumstances, we are
confident that the amount of time charged by appellants’ attorneys to draft, review, and
file the briefs, and argue the case, is not excessive.9
Having concluded that the bulk of appellants’ claimed hours were expended
reasonably, we note the following entries that are not appropriately compensable.
(1)  Although, as noted above, Mr. Yale’s entries noting his “att[entio]n” to
various matters are mostly sufficient to satisfy our documentation requirements, we note
two entries that are not.  A December 11, 2001 entry for “attn to papers” and a November
1, 2002 entry for “attn to status” do not provide any indication to what “papers” or
14
“status” Mr. Yale was attending.  We believe these entries are not sufficiently precise to
“determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed,” Washington,
89 F.3d at 1037 (internal quotation marks omitted), and we will therefore reduce his time
charge by two hours and 30 minutes (the rounded combined total of the two entries).  
(2)  A similar problem arises with two of Mr. Sugarman’s entries: a December 2,
2002 entry for “e-mails” and a December 3, 2002 entry for “conference call” are not
specific enough for us to know the subject of his actions, and we will therefore reduce his
time charge by one hour and 30 minutes (the combined total of the two entries).
(3)  We note that Mr. Sugarman spent approximately seven hours granting post-
decision telephone interviews to reporters.  We have held in the past that such matters are
not ordinarily compensable as legal services, see Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1995), and we will therefore reduce Mr. Sugarman’s
time charge by seven hours.
(4)  Like Messrs. Sugarman and Yale, Mr. Shapiro has two entries that are too
vague to allow us to determine the nature of his work: an October 1, 2001 entry for
“correspondence” and a January 14, 2002 entry for “review papers.”  We will, therefore,
reduce his time charge by one hour and 30 minutes (the combined total of the two
entries).
(5)  Mr. Shapiro also charged a total of three hours for administrative tasks,
including “organize and file correspondence regarding appeal” (one hour), “fax merits
  Times are rounded to the nearest quarter hour.10
  Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.11
15
disposition to Bob Sugarman and staff” (three-quarters of an hour), “forward order from
Court of Appeals” (half an hour), and “fax affidavit and correspondence” (three-quarters
of an hour).  We are somewhat reluctant to approve compensation at the high rates
charged for attorneys’ professional assistance “when a lawyer spends time on tasks that
are easily delegable to non-professional assistance.”  Halderman, 49 F.3d at 942.  We will
therefore reduce Mr. Shapiro’s time charge by two hours (a two-thirds reduction).
C.  Lodestar Amounts and Adjustments
With these reductions in mind, we calculate the lodestar amounts as follows:
Approved Hourly
Rate
Approved Hours  Lodestar10
Amount11
Mr. Sugarman $500.00 248.00 (reduced by
8.5 hours)
$124,000.00
Mr. Yale $350.00 245.00 (reduced by
2.5 hours)
$85,750.00
Mr. Lowenthal $175.00 400.00 (no
reduction)
$70,000.00
Mr. Shapiro $281.61 99.75 (reduced by
3.5 hours)
$28,091.00
Mr. Lewin $550.00 118.25 (no
reduction)
$65,038.00
Ms. Lewin $315.00 31.25 (no
reduction) 
$9,844.00
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We now consider whether these amounts should be adjusted based on any of the
factors mentioned in footnote 2 above.  Appellees contend that an adjustment is
appropriate because the issues involved in this case were not novel or complicated and
many of appellants’ arguments were not persuasive on appeal.  We have already rejected
the latter objection in Part II.B.1 above.  We reiterate that when a party’s claims are
connected such that it would be “difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-
claim basis,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, it is appropriate to award compensation for work
on all claims rather than only those claims that were successful.  That is the case here. 
Just as we deemed it inadvisable to consider appellants’ claims in isolation from each
other when determining the lodestar amounts, we will not do so when considering
whether to adjust those amounts.
We also reject appellees’ contention that this case was not novel or complicated. 
To the contrary, as we have already stated, the case presented complicated and important
questions of constitutional law.  Though we relied on existing precedents in deciding the
case, this does not mean the case was easy or the result obvious.  We do not, therefore,
believe it appropriate to decrease the lodestar amounts on that basis.
Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume the lodestar amounts
are reasonable, see, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984), and adopt those
amounts as the reasonable fees appellants’ counsel are owed.  
17
III.
Appellees also contest appellants’ claims for costs and expenses related to this
litigation.  These amounts — which are claimed only by Messrs. Sugarman, Yale,
Lowenthal, and Shapiro — include copying, printing, use of electronic databases like
Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw, travel, mail and shipping, and telephone charges.  They seek a
combined total of $33,373.63.    
It is well established that costs may be recovered as part of the “reasonable
attorney’s fee” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204,
1225-26 (3d Cir. 1995).  Appellants have submitted a detailed, itemized list of these
expenses that is over 40 pages long, and we therefore reject appellees’ argument that the
expenses are not documented sufficiently.  We are also confident that the costs and
expenses requested by Messrs. Sugarman, Yale, Lowenthal, and Shapiro are reasonable. 
Indeed, though they state conclusorily that certain charges are excessive, appellees have
presented no evidence of overbilling.  Moreover, our extensive experience with law firm
billing practices convinces us that the amounts claimed (about $6,700.00 for copying,
$12,000.00 for the use of electronic databases, $11,200.00 for transcripts and printing
costs, and several lesser expenses) are all well within the norm of such expenses in
complex litigation of this sort.  
Nonetheless, with respect to printing and copying costs, it appears some of the
charges may be duplicative of photocopying charges already awarded in the judgment that
18
accompanied our earlier decision on the merits.  Weil, Gotshal has already obtained
$2,025.15 to cover costs of photocopying its briefs and appendix, and we therefore reduce
the expenses approved here by that amount.  Thus, we grant Weil, Gotshal costs and
expenses in the amount of $30,445.00, and Hellring, Lindeman, Goldstein & Siegal LLP
(Mr. Shapiro’s law firm) $903.00 in costs and expenses.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, the motion by appellants Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc.
and Stefanie Dardik Gotlieb for attorneys’ fees and costs is hereby granted in the amount
of $339,189.00.  The motion for attorneys’ fees by appellants Chaim Book, Yosifa Book,
and Stephen Brenner is hereby granted in the amount of $74,882.00. 
